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Wage dispersion : why are similar workers paid differently / Dale T. Mortensen.

Por: Colaborador(es): Tipo de material: TextoTextoIdioma: Inglés Series Zeuthen lecture book series (MIT Press)Detalles de publicación: Cambridge, Massachusetts ; Londo, Inglaterra : MIT Press, 2005.Edición: First editionDescripción: xii, 143 páginas : ilustraciones, gráficas, tablas a blanco y negro ; 23 cmISBN:
  • 9780262134330
Tema(s): Clasificación LoC:
  • HD 6061  .M67 2005
Contenidos incompletos:
Series foreword, ix -- Foreword / by Karsten Albaek, xi -- Preface, xiii -- Introduction, 1 -- 1. Evidence in search of theory, 9 -- 2. The burdett-mortensen model, 35 -- 3. The shape of wage dispersion, 47 -- 4. Wage dispersion and worker flows, 71 -- 5. The wage-tenure relation, 97 -- Appendix: an existence proof, 125 -- afterword, 129 -- Bibliography, 133 -- Index, 139.
Resumen: Why are workers with identical skills found in both "good" jobs and "bad" jobs? Why are workers who do similar jobs paid differently, contrary to standard competitive theory? Observable differences in workers doing the same job account for only 30 percent of wage variation. In Wage Dispersion, Dale Mortensen examines the reasons for pay differentials in the other 70 percent. He finds that these differentials, or wage dispersion, are largely the result of job search friction (which arises when workers do not know the wages offered by all employers) and cross-firm differences in wage policy and productivity. Mortensen examines previous theoretical explanations for wage dispersion, testing them against data from a Danish matched employer-employee database. He begins by offering a simple one-period model of the problem, then expands this basic model intertemporally to include the role of on-the-job worker search behavior. Following this, he discusses theoretical modifications that offer an explanation for the nature of observed wage dispersion, particularly the shape of cross-firm wage distribution. He then examines the hypothesis that wage policies are determined by profit-maximizing behavior and finds that the Danish data do not support it; he argues that bilateral wage bargaining is the more likely determinant. Finally, he reviews recent work that extends the basic theoretical framework to explain wage dispersion within firms.
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Series foreword, ix -- Foreword / by Karsten Albaek, xi -- Preface, xiii -- Introduction, 1 -- 1. Evidence in search of theory, 9 -- 2. The burdett-mortensen model, 35 -- 3. The shape of wage dispersion, 47 -- 4. Wage dispersion and worker flows, 71 -- 5. The wage-tenure relation, 97 -- Appendix: an existence proof, 125 -- afterword, 129 -- Bibliography, 133 -- Index, 139.

Why are workers with identical skills found in both "good" jobs and "bad" jobs? Why are workers who do similar jobs paid differently, contrary to standard competitive theory? Observable differences in workers doing the same job account for only 30 percent of wage variation. In Wage Dispersion, Dale Mortensen examines the reasons for pay differentials in the other 70 percent. He finds that these differentials, or wage dispersion, are largely the result of job search friction (which arises when workers do not know the wages offered by all employers) and cross-firm differences in wage policy and productivity. Mortensen examines previous theoretical explanations for wage dispersion, testing them against data from a Danish matched employer-employee database. He begins by offering a simple one-period model of the problem, then expands this basic model intertemporally to include the role of on-the-job worker search behavior. Following this, he discusses theoretical modifications that offer an explanation for the nature of observed wage dispersion, particularly the shape of cross-firm wage distribution. He then examines the hypothesis that wage policies are determined by profit-maximizing behavior and finds that the Danish data do not support it; he argues that bilateral wage bargaining is the more likely determinant. Finally, he reviews recent work that extends the basic theoretical framework to explain wage dispersion within firms.

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