Central bank independence, targets and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi.

Figures and Tables, vi -- Preface, vii -- 1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview, 1 -- Part one: Extensions of the credibility model -- 2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control / with Wilko Letterie, 23 -- 3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments, 41 -- 4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias / with Otto H. Swank, 63 -- 5. Policy Delegation and Elections / with Otto H. Swank, 73 -- Part two: Central Bank independence and targets -- 6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets, 87 -- 7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism, 105 -- Part three: Some evidence -- 8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence / with Otto H. Swank, 121 -- References, 149 -- Index, 157.