The economic theory of auctions / edited by Paul Klemperer.

VOLUMEN 1 -- Acknowledgements, ix -- Foreword / Paul Klemperer, xi -- Part I. Introduction to the papers -- 1. Auction theory: a guide to the literature / Paul Klemperer, 3 -- Part II. Early literature -- 2. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders / William Vickrey, 65 -- 3. Auction and bidding games / William Vickrey, 95 -- 4. Toward a study of bidding processes part IV. Games with unknown costs / James H. Griesmer, Richard E. Levitan and Martin Shubik, 108 -- 5. A note on Ortega Reichert's a sequential game with information flow / Simon Board and Paul Klemperer, 126 -- 6. A sequential game with information flow / Armando Ortega Reichert, 130 -- 7. Competitive bidding with disparate information / Robert B. Wilson, 153 -- Part III. Introduction to the recent literature -- 8. Auctions and bidding / R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 159 -- 9. Auction theory with private values / Eric S. Maskin and John G. Riley, 199 -- Part IV. The basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue equivalence, and marginal revenues -- 10. Optimal auction design / Roger B. Myerson, 207 -- 11. Optimal auctions / John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, 223 -- 12. The simple economics of optimal auctions / Jeremy Bulow and John Roberts, 235 -- Part V. Risk aversion -- 13. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers / Eric Maskin and John Riley, 269 -- 14. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer's point of view / Steven Matthews, 315 -- Part VI. Correlation and affiliation -- 15. A Theory of auctions and competitive bidding / Paul R. Milgram and Robert J. Weber, 331 -- 16. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent / Jacques Cremer and Richard P. McLean, 365 -- 17. Optimal reservation prices in auctions / Dan Levin and James L. Smith, 382 -- Part VII. Asymmetries -- A. Private value differences -- 18. Government procurement and international trade / R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 399 -- 19. Asymmetric auctions / Eric Maskin and John Riley, 417 -- B. Almost common values -- 20. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions / Sushil Bikhchandani, 459 -- 21. Auctions with almost common values: the "wallet game" and its applications / Paul Klemperer, 482 -- C. Information Advantages -- 22. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction / Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber, 497 -- Part VIII. Entry costs and he number of bidders -- A. Endogenous entry of bidders -- 23. Equilibrium in auctions with entry / Dan Levin and James L. Smith, 511 -- 24. Optimal auctions revisited / Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 526 -- 25. Information acquisition in discriminatory auctions / Steven Matthews, 539 -- 26. A Theory of preemptive takeover bidding / Michael J. Fishman, 566 -- B. The value of additional bidders -- 27. Auctions versus negotiations / Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer, 583 -- C. Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders -- 28. A Bidding model of perfect competition / Robert Wilson, 601 -- 29. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding / Paul R. Milgram, 609 -- Part IX. Collusion -- 30. Collusion and the choice of auction / Marc S. Robinson, 635 -- 31. Bidding rings / R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 640 -- 32. Collusion in auctions / Kenneth Hendricks and Robert H. Porter, 661 -- Name index, 675.

VOLUMEN 2 -- Acknowledgements, ix -- A foreword and introductory article by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I -- Part X. Multiunit auctions -- A. Aptimal -- 1. Optimal multi-unit auctions / Eric Maskin and John Riley, 5 -- 2. Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information / Thomas R. Palfrey, 30 -- B. Simultaneous -- 3. Auctions of shares / Robert Wilson, 53 -- 4. Auctions of divisible goods: on the rationale for the treasury experiment / Kerry Back, Jaime F. Zender, 68 -- 5. Coordination in split award auctions / James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, 100 -- 6. Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty / Paul D. Klemperer and Margaret A. Meyer, 127 -- 7. Auctions with endogenous quantity / Robert G. Hansen, 162 -- C. Sequential -- 8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II / Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber, 179 -- 9. Rational frenzies and crashes / Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 195 -- 10. The declining price anomaly / R. Preston McAfee, Daniel Vincent, 218 -- 11. Multiple-object auctions / Robert J. Weber, 240 -- Part XI. Royalties, incentive contracts and payments for quality -- 12. Ex post information in auctions / John G. Riley, 269 -- 13. Auctioning incentive contracts / Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 290 -- 14. Design competition through multidimensional auctions / Yeon-Koo Che, 307 -- Part XII. Double auctions, etc. -- A. Double Auctions -- 15. Bargaining under incomplete information / Kalyan Chatterjee and William Samuelson, 325 -- 16. Incentive efficiency of double auctions / Robert Wilson, 342 -- 17. Convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information / Aldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams, 357 -- 18. A Dominant strategy double auction / R. Preston McAfee, 380 -- B. Related two-sided trading mechanisms -- 19. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading / Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 399 -- 20. Dissolving a partnership efficiently / Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer, 416 -- Part XIII. Other topics -- A budget constraints -- 21. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders / Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale, 439 -- B. Externalities between bidders -- 22. Strategic nonparticipation / Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu, 463 -- C. Jump bidding -- 23. Strategic jump bidding in english auctions / Christopher Avery, 481 -- D. War of attrition -- 24. The generalized war of attrition / Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 509 -- E. Competing auctioneers -- 25. Mechanism design by competing sellers / R. Preston McAfee, 527 -- Part XIV. Testing the theory -- A. Empirical -- 26. Game theory and empirical economics: the case of auction data / Jean-Jacques Laffont, 563 -- B. Experimental -- 27. Auctions: a survey of experimental research / John H. Kagel, 601 -- Name index, 687.