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Financial dominance = Dominanza finanziaria / M.K. Brunnermeier.

Por: Tipo de material: TextoTextoIdioma: Inglés Detalles de publicación: Roma : Banca d'Italia, 2015.Descripción: 113 páginas ; 22 cmTema(s): Clasificación LoC:
  • HD 61 .B78 2015
Contenidos:
1.Introduction, 11 -- 2. Ex-post redistribution and ex-ante insurance, 16 -- 2.1. Ex-post perspective: redistribution of losses and recapitalizations, 16 -- 2.2. Role of me financial sector: amplification and the paradox of prudence, 20 -- 2.3. Ex-ante perspective: risk transfers and insurance, 24 -- 2.4. The commitment problem: fiscal and monetary dominance, 25 -- 3. Government debt and financial dominance, 29 -- 3.1. The dual role of debt, 29 -- 3.2. Time-inconsistency and the liquidity problem for government debt, 32 -- 3.3. Using banks as hostages, 34 -- 3.3.1. The overcommitment problem, 35 -- 3.3.2. The secondary markers dilemma, 37 -- 3.3.3. Detrimental side effects: diabolic loop between sovereign and banking risk, 38 -- 3.3.4. Why purchase government bonds via banks and not directly?, 43 -- 3.4. The financial sector as an insurer, 44 -- 3.4.1. "Command and control" macro - prudential policy, 45 -- 3.4.2. "Race away from the bottom" macro - prudential regulation, 47 -- 4. Implications for Europe: ISBies, 48 -- 5. Conclusion, 52 -- References, 55.
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Monografía - Colección General SUCURSAL JUAN PABLO DUARTE Estantería HD 61 .B78 2015 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) Disponible 1009059

1.Introduction, 11 -- 2. Ex-post redistribution and ex-ante insurance, 16 -- 2.1. Ex-post perspective: redistribution of losses and recapitalizations, 16 -- 2.2. Role of me financial sector: amplification and the paradox of prudence, 20 -- 2.3. Ex-ante perspective: risk transfers and insurance, 24 -- 2.4. The commitment problem: fiscal and monetary dominance, 25 -- 3. Government debt and financial dominance, 29 -- 3.1. The dual role of debt, 29 -- 3.2. Time-inconsistency and the liquidity problem for government debt, 32 -- 3.3. Using banks as hostages, 34 -- 3.3.1. The overcommitment problem, 35 -- 3.3.2. The secondary markers dilemma, 37 -- 3.3.3. Detrimental side effects: diabolic loop between sovereign and banking risk, 38 -- 3.3.4. Why purchase government bonds via banks and not directly?, 43 -- 3.4. The financial sector as an insurer, 44 -- 3.4.1. "Command and control" macro - prudential policy, 45 -- 3.4.2. "Race away from the bottom" macro - prudential regulation, 47 -- 4. Implications for Europe: ISBies, 48 -- 5. Conclusion, 52 -- References, 55.

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