TY  - BOOK
AU  - Lippi, Francesco.
TI  - Central bank independence, targets and credibility: political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy 
SN  - 1858989159
AV  - HG  925 .L56 1999 
PY  - 1999///
CY  - Cheltenham, UK.
PB  - Edward Elgar Publishing
KW  - Bancos centrales
KW  - Política monetaria
KW  - Unión Europea
N1  - Figures and Tables, vi --; Preface, vii --; 1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview, 1 --; Part one: Extensions of the credibility model --; 2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control; with Wilko Letterie, 23 --; 3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments, 41 --; 4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias; with Otto H. Swank, 63 --; 5. Policy Delegation and Elections; with Otto H. Swank, 73 --; Part two: Central Bank independence and targets --; 6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets, 87 --; 7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism, 105 --; Part three: Some evidence --; 8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence; with Otto H. Swank, 121 --; References, 149 --; Index, 157
ER  -