The economic theory of auctions /
edited by Paul Klemperer.
- Cheltenham, Inglaterra : Northampton, Massachusetts : Edward Elgar, Publishing, 2000.
- 2 volúmenes : ilustraciones, gráficas a blanco y negro ; 25 cm.
- The international library of critical writings in economics / series editor Mark Blaug ; 113 An Elgar reference collection .
- The international library of critical writings in economics. An Elgar reference collection. .
VOLUMEN 1 -- Acknowledgements, ix -- Foreword / Part I. Introduction to the papers -- 1. Auction theory: a guide to the literature / Part II. Early literature -- 2. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders / 3. Auction and bidding games / 4. Toward a study of bidding processes part IV. Games with unknown costs / 5. A note on Ortega Reichert's a sequential game with information flow / 6. A sequential game with information flow / 7. Competitive bidding with disparate information / Part III. Introduction to the recent literature -- 8. Auctions and bidding / 9. Auction theory with private values / Part IV. The basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue equivalence, and marginal revenues -- 10. Optimal auction design / 11. Optimal auctions / 12. The simple economics of optimal auctions / Part V. Risk aversion -- 13. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers / 14. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer's point of view / Part VI. Correlation and affiliation -- 15. A Theory of auctions and competitive bidding / 16. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent / 17. Optimal reservation prices in auctions / Part VII. Asymmetries -- A. Private value differences -- 18. Government procurement and international trade / 19. Asymmetric auctions / B. Almost common values -- 20. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions / 21. Auctions with almost common values: the "wallet game" and its applications / C. Information Advantages -- 22. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction / Part VIII. Entry costs and he number of bidders -- A. Endogenous entry of bidders -- 23. Equilibrium in auctions with entry / 24. Optimal auctions revisited / 25. Information acquisition in discriminatory auctions / 26. A Theory of preemptive takeover bidding / B. The value of additional bidders -- 27. Auctions versus negotiations / C. Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders -- 28. A Bidding model of perfect competition / 29. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding / Part IX. Collusion -- 30. Collusion and the choice of auction / 31. Bidding rings / 32. Collusion in auctions / Name index, 675. Paul Klemperer, xi -- Paul Klemperer, 3 -- William Vickrey, 65 -- William Vickrey, 95 -- James H. Griesmer, Richard E. Levitan and Martin Shubik, 108 -- Simon Board and Paul Klemperer, 126 -- Armando Ortega Reichert, 130 -- Robert B. Wilson, 153 -- R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 159 -- Eric S. Maskin and John G. Riley, 199 -- Roger B. Myerson, 207 -- John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, 223 -- Jeremy Bulow and John Roberts, 235 -- Eric Maskin and John Riley, 269 -- Steven Matthews, 315 -- Paul R. Milgram and Robert J. Weber, 331 -- Jacques Cremer and Richard P. McLean, 365 -- Dan Levin and James L. Smith, 382 -- R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 399 -- Eric Maskin and John Riley, 417 -- Sushil Bikhchandani, 459 -- Paul Klemperer, 482 -- Paul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber, 497 -- Dan Levin and James L. Smith, 511 -- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 526 -- Steven Matthews, 539 -- Michael J. Fishman, 566 -- Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer, 583 -- Robert Wilson, 601 -- Paul R. Milgram, 609 -- Marc S. Robinson, 635 -- R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 640 -- Kenneth Hendricks and Robert H. Porter, 661 -- VOLUMEN 2 -- Acknowledgements, ix -- A foreword and introductory article by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I -- Part X. Multiunit auctions -- A. Aptimal -- 1. Optimal multi-unit auctions / 2. Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information / B. Simultaneous -- 3. Auctions of shares / 4. Auctions of divisible goods: on the rationale for the treasury experiment / 5. Coordination in split award auctions / 6. Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty / 7. Auctions with endogenous quantity / C. Sequential -- 8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II / 9. Rational frenzies and crashes / 10. The declining price anomaly / 11. Multiple-object auctions / Part XI. Royalties, incentive contracts and payments for quality -- 12. Ex post information in auctions / 13. Auctioning incentive contracts / 14. Design competition through multidimensional auctions / Part XII. Double auctions, etc. -- A. Double Auctions -- 15. Bargaining under incomplete information / 16. Incentive efficiency of double auctions / 17. Convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information / 18. A Dominant strategy double auction / B. Related two-sided trading mechanisms -- 19. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading / 20. Dissolving a partnership efficiently / Part XIII. Other topics -- A budget constraints -- 21. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders / B. Externalities between bidders -- 22. Strategic nonparticipation / C. Jump bidding -- 23. Strategic jump bidding in english auctions / D. War of attrition -- 24. The generalized war of attrition / E. Competing auctioneers -- 25. Mechanism design by competing sellers / Part XIV. Testing the theory -- A. Empirical -- 26. Game theory and empirical economics: the case of auction data / B. Experimental -- 27. Auctions: a survey of experimental research / Name index, 687. Eric Maskin and John Riley, 5 -- Thomas R. Palfrey, 30 -- Robert Wilson, 53 -- Kerry Back, Jaime F. Zender, 68 -- James J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, 100 -- Paul D. Klemperer and Margaret A. Meyer, 127 -- Robert G. Hansen, 162 -- Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber, 179 -- Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 195 -- R. Preston McAfee, Daniel Vincent, 218 -- Robert J. Weber, 240 -- John G. Riley, 269 -- Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 290 -- Yeon-Koo Che, 307 -- Kalyan Chatterjee and William Samuelson, 325 -- Robert Wilson, 342 -- Aldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams, 357 -- R. Preston McAfee, 380 -- Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 399 -- Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer, 416 -- Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale, 439 -- Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu, 463 -- Christopher Avery, 481 -- Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 509 -- R. Preston McAfee, 527 -- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 563 -- John H. Kagel, 601 --