Welfare economics /
edited by William J. Baumol and Charles A. Wilson.
- Cheltenham, Inglaterra ; Northampton, Massachusetts : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001.
- 3 volúmenes : ilustraciones, gráficas a blanco y negro ; 25 cm.
- The international library of critical writings in economics / series editor Mark Blaug ; 126 An Elgar reference collection .
- The international library of critical writings in economics. An Elgar reference collection. .
VOLUMEN 1 -- Acknowledgements ix -- Preface / Introduction / Part I. The criteria -- A. Pareto criterion and compensation principles -- 1. A note on welfare propositions in economics / 2. Evaluation of real national income / 3. Maximum ophelimity / B. Compensation and its shortcomings -- 4. Welfare propositions of economics and inter-personal comparisons of utility / 5. The valuation of social income / 6. The intransitivity of certain criteria used in welfare economics / 7. Aggregate demand, real national income, and the compensation principle / Part II. Foundations -- A. General treatment -- 8. Three basic postulates for applied welfare economics: an interpretive essay / 9. Distributional equity and the optimal structure of public prices / 10. The welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis / B. Tools for welfare measurement: single consumer and producer -- 11. The four consumer's surpluses / 12. Communications: rent as a measure of welfare change / 13. Consumer's surplus without apology / 14. The plain truth about consumer surplus / 15. Consumer's surplus in commodity space / Part III. Many-consumer economies -- A. Aggregation of welfare -- 16. Richard T. Ely lecture: economics and political economy and the significance of economic science -- Lord Robbins, 219 -- 17. A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics / 18. Social indifference curves / B. Does addition of consumers' and producers' surpluses add up? -- 19. A note on welfare surpluses and gains from trade in general equilibrium / 20. Another look at the social valuation of input price changes / 21. Welfare measures in a multimarket framework / 22. Cost-benefit criteria and the compensation principle in valuating small / Part IV. Choice between market and non-market allocation mechanisms -- 23. Market structure and optimal management organizations / 24. The nature of the firm / 25. The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation / 26. The architecture of economic systems: hierarchies and polyarchies / 27. On the economic theory of socialism / 28. A note on socialist economics / 29. The present state of the debate / Part V. Second-best analysis -- 30. The general theory of second best / 31. Welfare economics and the theory of second best / 32. Creating competition through interconnection: theory and practice / Name index, 561. William J. Baumol, Charles A. Wilson, xiii -- William J. Baumol, Charles A. Wilson, xv -- T. de Scitovszky, 5 -- Paul A. Samuelson, 17 -- Vilfredo Pareto, 46 -- Nicholas Kaldor, 51 -- J.R. Hicks, 55 -- W.M. Gorman, 75 -- John S. Chipman and James C. Moore, 86 -- Arnold C. Harberger, 119 -- Martin S. Feldstein, 132 -- Robin W. Boadway, 137 -- J.R. Hicks, 153 -- E.J. Mishan, 164 -- Robert D. Willig, 174 -- Ezra J. Mishan, 183 -- Alan Randall and John R. Stoll, 207 -- Abram Burk, 265 -- Paul A. Samuelson, 290 -- James E. Anderson, 315 -- Richard Schmalensee, 320 -- Richard E. Just and Darrell L. Hueth, 325 -- Neil Bruce and Richard G. Harris, 333 -- Clive Bull and Janusz A. Ordover, 357 -- R.H. Coase, 369 -- Kenneth J. Arrow, 389 -- Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 404 -- Oskar Lange, 416 -- A.P. Lerner, 435 -- F.A. von Hayek, 440 -- Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, 489 -- Otto A. Davis and Andrew B. Whinston, 517 -- Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 531 -- VOLUMEN 2 -- Acknowledgements, ix -- An introduction and preface by the editors to all three volumes appear in Volume I -- Part I. Virtues of the market mechanism -- 1. Excerpt from manual of political economy / 2. The ministry of production in the collectivist State / 3. Rates of return and the values of marginal private net products / Part II. Perfect competition: the fundamental theorems of welfare economics -- A. Basic analysis and results -- 4. The foundations of welfare economics / 5. An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics / 6. Allocation of resources and the price system / 7. Optimum / B. Application to intertemporal setting -- 8. An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or without the social contrivance of money / 9. On capital overaccumulation in the aggregative, neoclassical model of economic growth: a complete characterization / 10. The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing / 11. On the optimality of equilibrium when the market structure is incomplete / 12. The inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium / 13. Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete / Part III. Public goods, externalities and scale economies -- A. The broad issues -- 14. The anatomy of market failure / 15. The pure theory of public expenditure / B. Externalities, scale economies and nonconvexities -- 16. Hindrances to equality of marginal net products due to divergence between marginal social net product and marginal private net product / 17. Excerpt from industrial organization, continued. Division of Labour. The influence of machinery and limitations of the use of statical assumptions in regard to increasing return / 18. Of empty economic boxes / 19. Equity, efficiency and increasing returns / 20. Quasi optimality: the price we must pay for a price system / Part IV. Monopoly and imperfect competition -- A. General -- 21. Simple monopoly and discriminating monopoly / 22. Comparisons of monopoly and competitive output / 23. Pure and monopolistic competition compared / 24. Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition / B. Social costs of monopoly -- 25. Monopoly and resource allocation / 26. The social costs of monopoly and regulation / 27. Efficient rent seeking / 28. The social costs of monopoly and regulation: posner reconsidered / Part V. Asymmetric and imperfect information -- 29. The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism / 30. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: the roles of moral hazard and adverse selection / 31. Equilibrium and adverse selection / 32. The welfare economics of moral hazard / Part VI. Uncertainty -- 33. Does the consumer benefit from price instability? / 34. The desirability of price instability under perfect competition / 35. The consumer does benefit from feasible price stability / 36. Consumer's surplus, price instability, and consumer welfare / Name index, 685. Vilfredo Pareto, 3 -- E. Barone, 10 -- A.C. Pigou, M.A., 24 -- Oscar Lange, 31 -- Kenneth J. Arrow, 45 -- Tjalling C. Koopmans, 71 -- Gerard Debreu, 195 -- Paul A. Samuelson, 207 -- David Cass, 223 -- K.J. Arrow, 247 -- Oliver D. Hart, 253 -- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 279 -- John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, 300 -- Francis M. Bator, 335 -- Paul A. Samuelson, 364 -- A.C, Pigou, M.A., 369 -- Alfred Marshall, 393 -- J.H. Clapham, 414 -- Donald J. Brown and Geoffrey Heal, 414 -- William J. Baumol, 429 -- A.C. Pigou, M.A., 455 -- Joan Robinson, 480 -- Edward Chamberlin, 492 -- Michael Spence, 496 -- Arnold C. Harberger, 517 -- Richard A. Posner, 528 -- Gordon Tullock, 549 -- Franklin M. Fisher, 565 -- George A. Akerlof, 575 -- Mark V. Pauly, 588 -- Charles A. Wilson, 607 -- Richard Arnott, Joseph Stiglitz, 612 -- Frederick V.Waugh, 629 -- Walter Y.Oi, 642 -- Paul A. Samuelson, 649 -- Stephen J. Turnovsky, Haim Shalit, Andrew Schmitz, 667 -- VOLUMEN 3 -- . Acknowledgements, ix -- An introduction and preface by the editors to all three volumes appear in Volume I -- Part I. Externalities and pigouvian taxation -- 1. Excerpt from divergences between marginal social net product and marginal private net product / 2. External economies and diseconomies in a competitive situation / 3. The problem of social cost / 4. Externality / 5. On taxation and the control of externalities / 6. Prices vs. quantities / 7. The role of information in designing social policy towards externalities / 8. The limitations of pigouvian taxes as a long-run remedy for externalities / Part II. Ramsey pricing -- 9. A Contribution to the theory of taxation / 10. On the management of public monopolies subject to budgetary constraints / 11. Optimal departures from marginal cost pricing / 12. Optimal taxation and public production I: production efficiency / 13. Optimal taxation and public production II: tax rules / Part III. Predatory pricing -- 14. Predatory pricing and related practices under section 2 of the sherman act / 15. An economic definition of predation: pricing and product innovation / 16. Predation and the logic of the average variable cost test / Part IV. Regulation of prices -- A. Traditional regulation -- 17. Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint / 18. The traditional issues in the pricing of public utility services / B. Efficient regulation, stand-alone cost ceilings and price caps -- 19. Why regulate utilities? / 20. A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms / 21. Productivity incentive clauses and rate adjustment for inflation / 22. Regulation of British Telecommunications / 23. Contestability: developments since'the book / 24. The - regulation of multiproduct firms Part I: Theory and the regulation of multiproduct firms- Part II: Applications to competitive environments and policy analysis / C. Pricing of bottleneck inputs -- 25. The theory of network access pricing / 26. Having your cake: how to preserve universal-service cross subsidies while facilitating competitive entry / Name index, 651. A.C. Pigou, M.A., 3 -- J.E. Meade, 9 -- R.H. Coase, 23 -- James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine, 67 -- William J. Baumol, 81 -- Martin L. Weitzman, 97 -- J.A. Ordover, R.D. Willig, 112 -- Dennis W. Carlton and Glenn C. Loury, 141 -- F.P. Ramsey, 151 -- M. Boiteux, 166 -- William J. Baumol and David F. Bradford, 188 -- Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees, 207 -- Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees, 227 -- Phillip Areeda and Donald F.Turner, 247 -- Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig, 284 -- William J. Baumol, 330 -- Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, 359 -- Alfred E. Kahn, 377 -- Harold Demsetz, 417 -- Ingo Vogelsang and Jorg Finsinger, 428 -- William J. Baumol, 443 -- Stephen C. Littlechild, 451 -- William J. Baumol and Robert D. Willig, 493 -- Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 521 -- Robert D. Willig, 589 -- William J. Baumol, 633 --