TY  - BOOK
AU  - Persson, Torsten.,
AU  - Tabellini, Guido Enrico.,
TI  - Monetary and fiscal policy
SN  - 0262161400
AV  - HG 230 .3 .M633 1995 
PY  - 1995///
CY  - Londres
PB  - Mit Press
KW  - Política monetaria
KW  - Política fiscal
KW  - Ciencia política
N1  - Contiene : v.1 Credibility - v.2 Politics; Volume 1. Introduction, 1 --; I. The credibility problem --; 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans; Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 35 --; 2. Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government; Stanley Fischer, 57 --; 3. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy; Guillermo A. Calvo, 73 --; II. Reputation --; 4. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy; Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 99 --; 5. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information; Robert J. Barro, 123 --; 6. Sustainable Plans; V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe, 143 --; 7. Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time- Consistency Problem; Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 165 --; 8. Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?; Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 189 --; III Delegation --; 9. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate; Monetary Target and Kenneth Rogoff, 203 --; 10. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility; Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 225 --; 11. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe; Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 247 --; 12. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability; Torsten Persson and Guido Tabeilini, 279 --; 13. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England; Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 311 --; IV. Government financial structure --; 14. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital; Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, 347 --; 15. Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Mats Persson, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 389 --; 16. Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt?; Henning Bohn, 405 --; 17. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax; Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti, 421 --; 18. Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations; Guillermo A. Calvo, 451 --; Index, 473; Volume 2. Introduction, 1 --; 1. Elections and policy cycles --; 1. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control; John Ferejohn, 29 --; 2. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles; Kenneth Rogoff, 47 --; 3. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game; Alberto Alesina, 71 --; 4. Political Cycles in OECD Economies; Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini, 99 --; II. Public debt and political instability --; 5. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences; Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 137 --; 6. Voting on the Budget Deficit; Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina, 157 --; 7. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries; Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, 179 --; III. Redistribution --; 8. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government; Allan H. Meltzer and Scott P. Richard, 229 --; 9. Growth, Distribution, and Politics; Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 243 --; 10. The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution; Guido Tabellini, 263 --; 11. The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting; Randall Wright, 289 --; 12. Mobility and Redistribution; Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer, 313 --; 13. Tbe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics; Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 343 --; IV. Economic reform and the status quo --; 14. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in tbe Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty; Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, 371 --; 15. Wby Are Stabilizations Delayed?; Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, 387 --; 16. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints; Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, 415 --; Index, 459
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