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001			00000000000000002778
003			DO-SdBDB
005			20230312185434.0
008			010101s19991999uk a fr 001 0 eng d
020			_a1858989159
040			_aDO-SdBDB _bspa _cDO-SdBDB
041			_aeng
043			_ae-uk
050			_aHG 925 .L56 1999
100			_aLippi, Francesco.
245			_aCentral bank independence, targets and credibility : _bpolitical and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / _cFrancesco Lippi.
260			_aCheltenham, UK. : _bEdward Elgar Publishing, _c1999.
300			_aviii, 162 páginas : _bilustraciones a blanco y negro ; _c25 cm.
505	0	0	_aFigures and Tables, vi -- _tPreface, vii -- _t1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview, 1 -- _tPart one: Extensions of the credibility model -- _t2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control / _rwith Wilko Letterie, 23 -- _t3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments, 41 -- _t4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias / _rwith Otto H. Swank, 63 -- _t5. Policy Delegation and Elections / _rwith Otto H. Swank, 73 -- _tPart two: Central Bank independence and targets -- _t6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets, 87 -- _t7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism, 105 -- _tPart three: Some evidence -- _t8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence / _rwith Otto H. Swank, 121 -- _tReferences, 149 -- _tIndex, 157.
650		4	_aBancos centrales.
650		4	_aPolítica monetaria.
651		4	_aUnión Europea.
942			_cCG
999			_c61960 _d61960