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040			_aDO-SdBDB _bspa _cDO-SdBDB
041			_aeng
043			_ae-uk-en
050			_aHB 30 _b.I58 no.113
245			_aThe economic theory of auctions / _cedited by Paul Klemperer.
260			_aCheltenham, Inglaterra : _bNorthampton, Massachusetts : _bEdward Elgar, Publishing, _c2000.
300			_a2 volúmenes : _bilustraciones, gráficas a blanco y negro ; _c25 cm.
490			_aThe international library of critical writings in economics / series editor Mark Blaug ; _v113
490			_aAn Elgar reference collection
505			_aVOLUMEN 1 -- _tAcknowledgements, ix -- _tForeword / _rPaul Klemperer, xi -- _tPart I. Introduction to the papers -- _t1. Auction theory: a guide to the literature / _rPaul Klemperer, 3 -- _tPart II. Early literature -- _t2. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders / _rWilliam Vickrey, 65 -- _t3. Auction and bidding games / _rWilliam Vickrey, 95 -- _t4. Toward a study of bidding processes part IV. Games with unknown costs / _rJames H. Griesmer, Richard E. Levitan and Martin Shubik, 108 -- _t5. A note on Ortega Reichert's a sequential game with information flow / _rSimon Board and Paul Klemperer, 126 -- _t6. A sequential game with information flow / _rArmando Ortega Reichert, 130 -- _t7. Competitive bidding with disparate information / _rRobert B. Wilson, 153 -- _tPart III. Introduction to the recent literature -- _t8. Auctions and bidding / _rR. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 159 -- _t9. Auction theory with private values / _rEric S. Maskin and John G. Riley, 199 -- _tPart IV. The basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue equivalence, and marginal revenues -- _t10. Optimal auction design / _rRoger B. Myerson, 207 -- _t11. Optimal auctions / _rJohn G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, 223 -- _t12. The simple economics of optimal auctions / _rJeremy Bulow and John Roberts, 235 -- _tPart V. Risk aversion -- _t13. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers / _rEric Maskin and John Riley, 269 -- _t14. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: a buyer's point of view / _rSteven Matthews, 315 -- _tPart VI. Correlation and affiliation -- _t15. A Theory of auctions and competitive bidding / _rPaul R. Milgram and Robert J. Weber, 331 -- _t16. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interdependent / _rJacques Cremer and Richard P. McLean, 365 -- _t17. Optimal reservation prices in auctions / _rDan Levin and James L. Smith, 382 -- _tPart VII. Asymmetries -- _tA. Private value differences -- _t18. Government procurement and international trade / _rR. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 399 -- _t19. Asymmetric auctions / _rEric Maskin and John Riley, 417 -- _tB. Almost common values -- _t20. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions / _rSushil Bikhchandani, 459 -- _t21. Auctions with almost common values: the "wallet game" and its applications / _rPaul Klemperer, 482 -- _tC. Information Advantages -- _t22. The value of information in a sealed-bid auction / _rPaul Milgrom, Robert J. Weber, 497 -- _tPart VIII. Entry costs and he number of bidders -- _tA. Endogenous entry of bidders -- _t23. Equilibrium in auctions with entry / _rDan Levin and James L. Smith, 511 -- _t24. Optimal auctions revisited / _rRichard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 526 -- _t25. Information acquisition in discriminatory auctions / _rSteven Matthews, 539 -- _t26. A Theory of preemptive takeover bidding / _rMichael J. Fishman, 566 -- _tB. The value of additional bidders -- _t27. Auctions versus negotiations / _rJeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer, 583 -- _tC. Information aggregation with large numbers of bidders -- _t28. A Bidding model of perfect competition / _rRobert Wilson, 601 -- _t29. Rational expectations, information acquisition, and competitive bidding / _rPaul R. Milgram, 609 -- _tPart IX. Collusion -- _t30. Collusion and the choice of auction / _rMarc S. Robinson, 635 -- _t31. Bidding rings / _rR. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, 640 -- _t32. Collusion in auctions / _rKenneth Hendricks and Robert H. Porter, 661 -- _tName index, 675.
505			_aVOLUMEN 2 -- _tAcknowledgements, ix -- _tA foreword and introductory article by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I -- _tPart X. Multiunit auctions -- _tA. Aptimal -- _t1. Optimal multi-unit auctions / _rEric Maskin and John Riley, 5 -- _t2. Bundling decisions by a multiproduct monopolist with incomplete information / _rThomas R. Palfrey, 30 -- _tB. Simultaneous -- _t3. Auctions of shares / _rRobert Wilson, 53 -- _t4. Auctions of divisible goods: on the rationale for the treasury experiment / _rKerry Back, Jaime F. Zender, 68 -- _t5. Coordination in split award auctions / _rJames J. Anton, Dennis A. Yao, 100 -- _t6. Supply function equilibria in oligopoly under uncertainty / _rPaul D. Klemperer and Margaret A. Meyer, 127 -- _t7. Auctions with endogenous quantity / _rRobert G. Hansen, 162 -- _tC. Sequential -- _t8. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, II / _rPaul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber, 179 -- _t9. Rational frenzies and crashes / _rJeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 195 -- _t10. The declining price anomaly / _rR. Preston McAfee, Daniel Vincent, 218 -- _t11. Multiple-object auctions / _rRobert J. Weber, 240 -- _tPart XI. Royalties, incentive contracts and payments for quality -- _t12. Ex post information in auctions / _rJohn G. Riley, 269 -- _t13. Auctioning incentive contracts / _rJean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 290 -- _t14. Design competition through multidimensional auctions / _rYeon-Koo Che, 307 -- _tPart XII. Double auctions, etc. -- _tA. Double Auctions -- _t15. Bargaining under incomplete information / _rKalyan Chatterjee and William Samuelson, 325 -- _t16. Incentive efficiency of double auctions / _rRobert Wilson, 342 -- _t17. Convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information / _rAldo Rustichini, Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams, 357 -- _t18. A Dominant strategy double auction / _rR. Preston McAfee, 380 -- _tB. Related two-sided trading mechanisms -- _t19. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading / _rRoger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 399 -- _t20. Dissolving a partnership efficiently / _rPeter Cramton, Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer, 416 -- _tPart XIII. Other topics -- _tA budget constraints -- _t21. Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders / _rYeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale, 439 -- _tB. Externalities between bidders -- _t22. Strategic nonparticipation / _rPhilippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu, 463 -- _tC. Jump bidding -- _t23. Strategic jump bidding in english auctions / _rChristopher Avery, 481 -- _tD. War of attrition -- _t24. The generalized war of attrition / _rJeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer, 509 -- _tE. Competing auctioneers -- _t25. Mechanism design by competing sellers / _rR. Preston McAfee, 527 -- _tPart XIV. Testing the theory -- _tA. Empirical -- _t26. Game theory and empirical economics: the case of auction data / _rJean-Jacques Laffont, 563 -- _tB. Experimental -- _t27. Auctions: a survey of experimental research / _rJohn H. Kagel, 601 -- _tName index, 687.
650			_aSubastas.
700			_aKlemperer, Paul., _eedited.
700			_aBlaug, Mark., _eseries editor.
830		4	_aThe international library of critical writings in economics.
830		3	_aAn Elgar reference collection.
942			_cCG
999			_c63001 _d63001