000			04833nam a2200289 4500
001			04357
003			DO-SdBDB
005			20230312190626.0
008			970619s19951995uk a fr 001 0 eng d
020			_a0262161400
040			_aDO-SdBDB _bspa _cDO-SdBDB
041			_aeng
043			_ae-uk
050			_aHG 230 .3 .M633 1995
245			_aMonetary and fiscal policy / _cedited by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.
260			_aLondres : _bMit Press, _c1995.
300			_a2 volumenes : _bilustraciones a blanco y negro ; _c23 cm.
500			_aContiene : v.1 Credibility - v.2 Politics.
505	0	0	_aVolume 1. Introduction, 1 -- _tI. The credibility problem -- _t1. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans / _rFinn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 35 -- _t2. Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government / _rStanley Fischer, 57 -- _t3. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy / _rGuillermo A. Calvo, 73 -- _tII. Reputation -- _t4. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy / _rRobert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 99 -- _t5. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information / _rRobert J. Barro, 123 -- _t6. Sustainable Plans / _rV. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe, 143 -- _t7. Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time- Consistency Problem / _rLaurence J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 165 -- _t8. Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? / _rJeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 189 -- _tIII Delegation -- _t9. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate / _rMonetary Target and Kenneth Rogoff, 203 -- _t10. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility / _rFrancesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 225 -- _t11. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe / _rAlberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 247 -- _t12. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability / _rTorsten Persson and Guido Tabeilini, 279 -- _t13. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England / _rDouglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 311 -- _tIV. Government financial structure -- _t14. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital / _rRobert E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, 347 -- _t15. Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy / _rMats Persson, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 389 -- _t16. Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt? / _rHenning Bohn, 405 -- _t17. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax / _rGuillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti, 421 -- _t18. Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations / _rGuillermo A. Calvo, 451 -- _tIndex, 473.
505	0	0	_aVolume 2. Introduction, 1 -- _t1. Elections and policy cycles -- _t1. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control / _rJohn Ferejohn, 29 -- _t2. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles / _rKenneth Rogoff, 47 -- _t3. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game / _rAlberto Alesina, 71 -- _t4. Political Cycles in OECD Economies / _rAlberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini, 99 -- _tII. Public debt and political instability -- _t5. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences / _rTorsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 137 -- _t6. Voting on the Budget Deficit / _rGuido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina, 157 -- _t7. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries / _rVittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, 179 -- _tIII. Redistribution -- _t8. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government / _rAllan H. Meltzer and Scott P. Richard, 229 -- _t9. Growth, Distribution, and Politics / _rTorsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 243 -- _t10. The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution / _rGuido Tabellini, 263 -- _t11. The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting / _rRandall Wright, 289 -- _t12. Mobility and Redistribution / _rDennis Epple and Thomas Romer, 313 -- _t13. Tbe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics / _rBarry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 343 -- _tIV. Economic reform and the status quo -- _t14. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in tbe Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty / _rRaquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, 371 -- _t15. Wby Are Stabilizations Delayed? / _rAlberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, 387 -- _t16. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints / _rMathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, 415 -- _tIndex, 459.
650		4	_aPolítica monetaria.
650		4	_aPolítica fiscal.
650		4	_aCiencia política.
700			_aPersson, Torsten., _eedited.
700			_aTabellini, Guido Enrico., _eedited.
942			_cCG
999			_c66275 _d66275