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Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: when nudging hurts.



Handel, Benjamin R.

Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: when nudging hurts.

Bibliografía : páginas 2681-2682.

Data and environment, 2648 ; Preliminary analysis, 2655 ; Empirical framework, 2660 ; Choice model results, 2665 ; Policies that reduce inertia: interaction with adverse selection, 2669 ; Conclusion, 2679

This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern.

00028282


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