Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: when nudging hurts.
Tipo de material:
ArtículoIdioma: Inglés ISSN: - 00028282
Contenidos:
En: American economic reviewResumen: This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern.
Preliminary analysis, 2655 ; Empirical framework, 2660 ; Choice model results, 2665 ; Policies that reduce inertia: interaction with adverse selection, 2669 ; Conclusion, 2679
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Bibliografía : páginas 2681-2682.
Data and environment, 2648 ; Preliminary analysis, 2655 ; Empirical framework, 2660 ; Choice model results, 2665 ; Policies that reduce inertia: interaction with adverse selection, 2669 ; Conclusion, 2679
This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern.
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