Monetary and fiscal policy /
Monetary and fiscal policy /
edited by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.
- Londres : Mit Press, 1995.
- 2 volumenes : ilustraciones a blanco y negro ; 23 cm.
Contiene : v.1 Credibility - v.2 Politics.
Volume 1. Introduction, 1 -- I. The credibility problem -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans / 2. Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government / 3. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy / II. Reputation -- 4. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy / 5. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information / 6. Sustainable Plans / 7. Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time- Consistency Problem / 8. Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? / III Delegation -- 9. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate / 10. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility / 11. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe / 12. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability / 13. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England / IV. Government financial structure -- 14. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital / 15. Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy / 16. Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt? / 17. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax / 18. Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations / Index, 473. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 35 -- Stanley Fischer, 57 -- Guillermo A. Calvo, 73 -- Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 99 -- Robert J. Barro, 123 -- V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe, 143 -- Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 165 -- Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 189 -- Monetary Target and Kenneth Rogoff, 203 -- Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 225 -- Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 247 -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabeilini, 279 -- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 311 -- Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, 347 -- Mats Persson, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 389 -- Henning Bohn, 405 -- Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti, 421 -- Guillermo A. Calvo, 451 -- Volume 2. Introduction, 1 -- 1. Elections and policy cycles -- 1. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control / 2. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles / 3. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game / 4. Political Cycles in OECD Economies / II. Public debt and political instability -- 5. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences / 6. Voting on the Budget Deficit / 7. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries / III. Redistribution -- 8. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government / 9. Growth, Distribution, and Politics / 10. The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution / 11. The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting / 12. Mobility and Redistribution / 13. Tbe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics / IV. Economic reform and the status quo -- 14. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in tbe Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty / 15. Wby Are Stabilizations Delayed? / 16. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints / Index, 459. John Ferejohn, 29 -- Kenneth Rogoff, 47 -- Alberto Alesina, 71 -- Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini, 99 -- Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 137 -- Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina, 157 -- Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, 179 -- Allan H. Meltzer and Scott P. Richard, 229 -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 243 -- Guido Tabellini, 263 -- Randall Wright, 289 -- Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer, 313 -- Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 343 -- Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, 371 -- Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, 387 -- Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, 415 --
0262161400
Política monetaria.
Política fiscal.
Ciencia política.
HG 230 .3 .M633 1995
Contiene : v.1 Credibility - v.2 Politics.
Volume 1. Introduction, 1 -- I. The credibility problem -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans / 2. Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government / 3. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy / II. Reputation -- 4. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy / 5. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information / 6. Sustainable Plans / 7. Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time- Consistency Problem / 8. Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? / III Delegation -- 9. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate / 10. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility / 11. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe / 12. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability / 13. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England / IV. Government financial structure -- 14. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital / 15. Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy / 16. Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt? / 17. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax / 18. Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations / Index, 473. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 35 -- Stanley Fischer, 57 -- Guillermo A. Calvo, 73 -- Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 99 -- Robert J. Barro, 123 -- V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe, 143 -- Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 165 -- Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 189 -- Monetary Target and Kenneth Rogoff, 203 -- Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 225 -- Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 247 -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabeilini, 279 -- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 311 -- Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, 347 -- Mats Persson, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 389 -- Henning Bohn, 405 -- Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti, 421 -- Guillermo A. Calvo, 451 -- Volume 2. Introduction, 1 -- 1. Elections and policy cycles -- 1. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control / 2. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles / 3. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game / 4. Political Cycles in OECD Economies / II. Public debt and political instability -- 5. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences / 6. Voting on the Budget Deficit / 7. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries / III. Redistribution -- 8. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government / 9. Growth, Distribution, and Politics / 10. The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution / 11. The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting / 12. Mobility and Redistribution / 13. Tbe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics / IV. Economic reform and the status quo -- 14. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in tbe Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty / 15. Wby Are Stabilizations Delayed? / 16. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints / Index, 459. John Ferejohn, 29 -- Kenneth Rogoff, 47 -- Alberto Alesina, 71 -- Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini, 99 -- Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 137 -- Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina, 157 -- Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, 179 -- Allan H. Meltzer and Scott P. Richard, 229 -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 243 -- Guido Tabellini, 263 -- Randall Wright, 289 -- Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer, 313 -- Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 343 -- Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, 371 -- Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, 387 -- Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, 415 --
0262161400
Política monetaria.
Política fiscal.
Ciencia política.
HG 230 .3 .M633 1995