Monetary and fiscal policy / edited by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.

Contiene : v.1 Credibility - v.2 Politics.

Volume 1. Introduction, 1 -- I. The credibility problem -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans / Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 35 -- 2. Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government / Stanley Fischer, 57 -- 3. On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy / Guillermo A. Calvo, 73 -- II. Reputation -- 4. Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy / Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 99 -- 5. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information / Robert J. Barro, 123 -- 6. Sustainable Plans / V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe, 143 -- 7. Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time- Consistency Problem / Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 165 -- 8. Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? / Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 189 -- III Delegation -- 9. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate / Monetary Target and Kenneth Rogoff, 203 -- 10. The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility / Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, 225 -- 11. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe / Alberto Alesina and Vittorio Grilli, 247 -- 12. Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabeilini, 279 -- 13. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England / Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 311 -- IV. Government financial structure -- 14. Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital / Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Nancy L. Stokey, 347 -- 15. Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy / Mats Persson, Torsten Persson, and Lars E. O. Svensson, 389 -- 16. Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt? / Henning Bohn, 405 -- 17. On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax / Guillermo A. Calvo and Pablo E. Guidotti, 421 -- 18. Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations / Guillermo A. Calvo, 451 -- Index, 473.

Volume 2. Introduction, 1 -- 1. Elections and policy cycles -- 1. Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control / John Ferejohn, 29 -- 2. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles / Kenneth Rogoff, 47 -- 3. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game / Alberto Alesina, 71 -- 4. Political Cycles in OECD Economies / Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini, 99 -- II. Public debt and political instability -- 5. Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences / Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 137 -- 6. Voting on the Budget Deficit / Guido Tabellini and Alberto Alesina, 157 -- 7. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries / Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro, and Guido Tabellini, 179 -- III. Redistribution -- 8. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government / Allan H. Meltzer and Scott P. Richard, 229 -- 9. Growth, Distribution, and Politics / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, 243 -- 10. The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution / Guido Tabellini, 263 -- 11. The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting / Randall Wright, 289 -- 12. Mobility and Redistribution / Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer, 313 -- 13. Tbe Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics / Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 343 -- IV. Economic reform and the status quo -- 14. Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in tbe Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty / Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik, 371 -- 15. Wby Are Stabilizations Delayed? / Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen, 387 -- 16. Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints / Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland, 415 -- Index, 459.