Independent central banks and economic performance /
Independent central banks and economic performance /
edited by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger.
- Cheltenham, Inglaterra ; Lyme, US : Edward Elgar Publishing, 1997.
- xxvi, 643 páginas : ilustraciones, gráficas, tablas a blanco y negro ; 25 cm.
- The international library of critical writings in economics / series editor Mark Blaug ; 82 An Elgar reference collection .
- The international library of critical writings in economics. An Elgar reference collection. .
Acknowledgements, ix -- Introduction by the editor, xi -- Part I. Theoretical Foundations of Central Bank Independence -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of optimal plans / 2. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary Policy / 3. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target / 4. Precommitment by central bank independence / 5. Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility / 6. Optimal contracts for central bankers / Part II. Measures of central bank independence -- 7. Politics and business cycles in industrial democracies / 8. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries / 9. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes / 10. Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries / 11. Central bank independence, political influence and macroeconomic performance / 12. Central Bank Independence in another eleven countries / Part III. Empirical evidence on central bank independence -- 13. The case for central bank independence / 14. Central Bank Independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence / 15. Central bank independence: theory and evidence / 16. Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates / 17. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? / 18. The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation / Part IV. Determinants of central bank independence -- 19. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics / 20. Commitment through delegation, political influence and central bank independence / 21. Variation in central bank independence across countries: some provisional empirical evidence / 22. Political influence on the central bank: international evidence / 23. Optimal commitment in an open economy: credibility vs flexibility / Name índex, 639. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 3 -- Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 22 -- Kenneth Rogoff, 43 -- Manfred J.M. Neumann, 64 -- Susanne Lohmann, 82 -- Carl E. Walsh, 96 -- Alberto Alesina, 117 -- Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 161 -- Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti, 213 -- Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 259 -- Alex Cukierman, 281 -- Sylvester Eijffinger and Martijn van Keulen, 302 -- Jakob de Haan and Jan Egbert Sturm, 349 -- Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, 372 -- Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling, 384 -- Alex Cukiennan, Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Lawrence H. Summers and Steven B. Webb, 416 -- Guy Debelle, Stanley Fischer, 462 -- Thomas F. Cargill, 489 -- Adam S. Posen, 505 -- Alex Cukiennan, 530 -- Jakob de Haan and Gert Jan Van 't Hag, 550 -- Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb, 567 -- Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 594 --
1858984475
Bancos centrales.
Política monetaria.
HB 30 / .I58 no. 82
Acknowledgements, ix -- Introduction by the editor, xi -- Part I. Theoretical Foundations of Central Bank Independence -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of optimal plans / 2. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary Policy / 3. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target / 4. Precommitment by central bank independence / 5. Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility / 6. Optimal contracts for central bankers / Part II. Measures of central bank independence -- 7. Politics and business cycles in industrial democracies / 8. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries / 9. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes / 10. Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries / 11. Central bank independence, political influence and macroeconomic performance / 12. Central Bank Independence in another eleven countries / Part III. Empirical evidence on central bank independence -- 13. The case for central bank independence / 14. Central Bank Independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence / 15. Central bank independence: theory and evidence / 16. Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates / 17. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? / 18. The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation / Part IV. Determinants of central bank independence -- 19. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics / 20. Commitment through delegation, political influence and central bank independence / 21. Variation in central bank independence across countries: some provisional empirical evidence / 22. Political influence on the central bank: international evidence / 23. Optimal commitment in an open economy: credibility vs flexibility / Name índex, 639. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 3 -- Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 22 -- Kenneth Rogoff, 43 -- Manfred J.M. Neumann, 64 -- Susanne Lohmann, 82 -- Carl E. Walsh, 96 -- Alberto Alesina, 117 -- Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 161 -- Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti, 213 -- Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 259 -- Alex Cukierman, 281 -- Sylvester Eijffinger and Martijn van Keulen, 302 -- Jakob de Haan and Jan Egbert Sturm, 349 -- Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, 372 -- Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling, 384 -- Alex Cukiennan, Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Lawrence H. Summers and Steven B. Webb, 416 -- Guy Debelle, Stanley Fischer, 462 -- Thomas F. Cargill, 489 -- Adam S. Posen, 505 -- Alex Cukiennan, 530 -- Jakob de Haan and Gert Jan Van 't Hag, 550 -- Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb, 567 -- Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 594 --
1858984475
Bancos centrales.
Política monetaria.
HB 30 / .I58 no. 82