Independent central banks and economic performance / edited by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger.

Acknowledgements, ix -- Introduction by the editor, xi -- Part I. Theoretical Foundations of Central Bank Independence -- 1. Rules Rather than Discretion: the Inconsistency of optimal plans / Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, 3 -- 2. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary Policy / Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 22 -- 3. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target / Kenneth Rogoff, 43 -- 4. Precommitment by central bank independence / Manfred J.M. Neumann, 64 -- 5. Optimal commitment in monetary policy: credibility versus flexibility / Susanne Lohmann, 82 -- 6. Optimal contracts for central bankers / Carl E. Walsh, 96 -- Part II. Measures of central bank independence -- 7. Politics and business cycles in industrial democracies / Alberto Alesina, 117 -- 8. Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries / Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 161 -- 9. Measuring the independence of central banks and its effect on policy outcomes / Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti, 213 -- 10. Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries / Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 259 -- 11. Central bank independence, political influence and macroeconomic performance / Alex Cukierman, 281 -- 12. Central Bank Independence in another eleven countries / Sylvester Eijffinger and Martijn van Keulen, 302 -- Part III. Empirical evidence on central bank independence -- 13. The case for central bank independence / Jakob de Haan and Jan Egbert Sturm, 349 -- 14. Central Bank Independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence / Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers, 372 -- 15. Central bank independence: theory and evidence / Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling, 384 -- 16. Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates / Alex Cukiennan, Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Lawrence H. Summers and Steven B. Webb, 416 -- 17. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? / Guy Debelle, Stanley Fischer, 462 -- 18. The statistical association between central bank independence and inflation / Thomas F. Cargill, 489 -- Part IV. Determinants of central bank independence -- 19. Why central bank independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics / Adam S. Posen, 505 -- 20. Commitment through delegation, political influence and central bank independence / Alex Cukiennan, 530 -- 21. Variation in central bank independence across countries: some provisional empirical evidence / Jakob de Haan and Gert Jan Van 't Hag, 550 -- 22. Political influence on the central bank: international evidence / Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb, 567 -- 23. Optimal commitment in an open economy: credibility vs flexibility / Sylvester Eijffinger, Eric Schaling, 594 -- Name índex, 639.